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FOREWORD 
Great progress has been made in recent years in securing better access and financial protection 
against the cost of illness through collective financing of health care.  This publication – Risk 
Pooling in Health Care Finance: The Implications for Health System Performance by Peter C. 
Smith and Sophie N. Witter – is part of a series of Discussions Papers that review ways to make 
public spending on health care more efficient and equitable in developing countries through 
strategic purchasing and contracting services from nongovernmental providers.  
 
Promoting health and confronting disease challenges requires action across a range of activities 
in the health system. This includes improvements in the policymaking and stewardship role of 
governments, better access to human resources, drugs, medical equipment, and consumables, and 
a greater engagement of both public and private providers of services.   
 
Managing scarce resources and health care effectively and efficiently is an important part of this 
story.  Experience has shown that, without strategic policies and focused spending mechanisms, 
the poor and other ordinary people are likely to get left out.  The use of purchasing as a tool to 
enhance public sector performance is well documented in other sectors of the economy.  
Extension of this experience to the health sector is more recent and lessons learned are now 
being successfully applied to developing countries. 
 
The shift from hiring staff in the public sector and producing services “in house” from non 
governmental providers has been at the center of a lively debate on collective financing of health 
care during recent years.  Its underlying premise is that it is necessary to separate the functions 
of financing health services from the production process of service delivery to improve public 
sector accountability and performance. 
 
In this Discussion Paper, Smith and Witter review the role of revenue pooling and risk sharing in 
resource allocation and purchasing.  The authors observe that in collective financing of health 
care, there is no reason that an individual’s own financial contribution to the revenue pool should 
be related health risks, health care utilization and spending patterns.  Rather, it is policymakers 
that determine the extent to which an individual’s financial contribution depend on their 
financial means, their utilization of health services and other factors.  By “uncoupling” revenues 
and expenditures in this way, policy makers have a powerful instrument to achieve both re-
distributional and health equity goals. 
 
Alexander S. Preker 
 
Lead Economist 
Editor of HNP Publications 
 
vii 
 
 
viii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The authors thank Jack Langenbrunner, Maureen Lewis, Alex Preker and Paul Shaw of the 
World Bank, Philip Davies of the World Health Organization, and participants at the workshop 
for comments. In addition, the authors of this Report are grateful to the World Bank for having 
published it as an HNP Discussion Paper. 
 
 
ix 
 
 
 
x 
 INTRODUCTION 
This report examines risk pooling in health care finance, with particular reference to developing 
economies. Pooling is the health system function whereby collected health revenues are 
transferred to purchasing organizations. Pooling ensures that the risk related to financing health 
interventions is borne by all the members of the pool, not by each contributor individually. Its 
main purpose is to share the financial risk associated with health interventions for which the 
need is uncertain.  
 
The purpose of the report is to (i) identify modalities of pooling particularly relevant to 
developing countries; (ii) assess the impact of various ways of pooling on health system 
performance; (iii) provide guidelines to design functional pooling arrangements in a variety of 
health systems context; and (iv) present best practice. The report covers issues related to 
purchasing only to the extent that they directly relate to the risk-pooling function. 
 
The report is arranged as follows. The next section examines the rationale for risk pooling. It is 
followed by a discussion of the various types of risk pooling that exist. The following section 
examines the issues that arise when seeking to implement risk pooling in practice. Experience in 
low- and middle-income countries is then discussed. The report ends with a discussion of the 
implications for health care policy. 
WHY RISK POOLING IN HEALTH CARE FINANCE? 
In contrast to many of life’s necessities, an individual’s need for health care is uncertain. While 
an individual’s expenditure on (say) food is regular and largely predictable, that same 
individual’s expenditure on health care is to largely unknowable, both in magnitude and timing. 
It is therefore intrinsically difficult for an individual to make financial provision for episodes of 
sickness or even chronic health care needs. Furthermore, if (as is generally accepted) most 
individuals are risk averse, they would value arrangements that protect them from this 
uncertainty in expenditure. 
 
Despite this large uncertainty, health care expenditure needs of individuals can often, to some 
extent, be predicted. Other things being equal, older people tend to have higher spending needs 
than younger people (except for the very young), and people with chronic health conditions tend 
to have higher spending needs than healthy individuals. To the extent that characteristics such as 
age and health status can be measured, predictions of health care spending for a particular 
individual can be improved. Developments such as genetic testing offer the prospect of refining 
further such predictions. 
 
However, as Newhouse and others [1] have shown, even if every conceivable factor contributing 
to an individual’s health care spending could be measured, only about 20 percent of the variation 
in annual expenditure could be predicted. And, in practice, even if excellent information systems 
are available, that figure rarely rises above 10 percent [2]. 
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 The uncertainty in health care expenditure has two elements: its timing and its magnitude. 
Suppose first that all individuals were expected to incur the same health care expenditure over 
the course of their lifetimes and that the only uncertain element is the timing of that expenditure. 
Then, in principle, financial provision for health care could be made in the form of identical 
individual health care funds, to be used as required over the course of the individual’s lifetime, 
and that are run down to zero by death. Such a fund could be endowed on all citizens at birth, or 
could be financed by regular contributions from the individual, say, over a working lifetime. The 
role of the individual fund is to protect the citizen from lumpy expenditure needs of uncertain 
timing, and to offer unhindered access to necessary health care when the need arises. In effect, 
the annual risks associated with health care expenditure are pooled across an individual’s 
lifetime.  
 
This sort of principle underlies the use of medical savings accounts in countries such as 
Singapore [3]. In a similar vein, there has been some examination in developed countries of the 
extent to which an individual’s death is the major indicator of the timing of health care 
expenditure, on the grounds that the year before death is known to be a period of particularly 
intense use of health care, but the findings suggest that this is only one of many important 
predictors of expenditure [4]. 
 
In practice, the timing of expenditure is only one element of the uncertain need for health care 
confronting individuals, and there are also substantial variations in the lifetime expenditure on 
health care associated with different individuals. We might characterize the spectrum of lifetime 
expenditure as moving from “healthy” individuals (low lifetime expenditure) to “unhealthy” 
individuals. In practice, individuals with chronic medical conditions might be expected to be 
toward the unhealthy end of the spectrum.  
 
Society could in principle take the view that the pursuit of health and consumption of health care 
are matters strictly for the individual to arrange, and offer the individual no intervention from the 
broader community to compensate for variations in health care expenditure needs. Such an 
extreme individualistic position has rarely been adopted in practice. Instead, to a greater or lesser 
extent, all systems of health care implicitly pool the risks associated with individual health care 
needs.1 The World Health Organization defines risk pooling as “the practice of bringing several 
risks together for insurance purposes in order to balance the consequences of the realization of 
each individual risk” [5]. 
 
In the extreme, all health care resources available for people of all needs could be pooled, and 
access to health care determined solely by clinical need. If patients are charged no out-of-pocket 
fee for such access, this arrangement implies an implicit redistribution of resources from the 
                                                 
1  In the English language the concept of “risk” is ambiguous, and has at least two quite distinct connotations 
relevant to this paper: risk defined as the relative propensity to incur health care expenditure (in the sense of a 
“high-risk patient”); and risk defined as the unpredictable variability associated with a particular expected level of 
expenditure. The creation of risk pools refers to both definitions. It amalgamates individuals with different expected 
health care needs (definition 1), but also reduces the per capita variability in total health care needs (definition 2). 
Both notions of risk are of fundamental importance in the design, management, and performance of the health care 
system. If there is any doubt about the intended meaning, we use the expression “variability” when employing the 
second sense of the word. 
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 healthy to the less healthy. This is the principle to which certain unitary systems of health care 
aspire, as for example in the U.K. National Health Service (NHS). The intention is that equal 
opportunity of access should be offered on the basis of clinical need only, regardless of any other 
individual characteristics such as wealth or area of residence. In practice, all systems of health 
care exhibit a mix of these two extreme principles of no pooling and complete pooling.  
 
Any health care risk pool must be financed, but pooling implies that there is no reason the 
magnitude of individual contributions to the finance should be related to health status or health 
care utilization. Rather, society must choose the extent to which individual financial 
contributions depend on financial means, health care utilization, or other factors. Whatever 
system is chosen, a crucial constraint is that the revenues received must be sufficient to provide 
the desired system of health care.  
 
The World Health Organization [5] illustrates two of the redistributive issues implicit in risk 
pooling (from healthy to sick, and from rich to poor) by means of two stylized scenarios: 
 
• Members might make equal financial contributions, but the pool effectively enables a 
transfer to be made from the relatively healthy to the sick (the risk pooling function). A 
community financing program charging members a flat rate might be expected to 
function in this way. 
• Members might make equal use of health care, but by seeking differential financial 
contributions the pool effectively enables a transfer to be made from the rich to the poor 
(the income redistribution function). This is the aim of health financing systems that base 
contributions on income (for example, many social insurance programs). 
To these we would add a third: 
 
• Members might make equal financial contributions and make equal use of health care 
across their lifetimes, but the pool enables a transfer to be made depending on the stage 
of the individual’s life cycle. This is the life cycle redistributive function of the risk pool. 
 
These concepts are illustrated in the resource allocation and purchasing (RAP) concept note as in 
Figure 1 [6]. 
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 Figure 1: Pooling of revenues implies transfers (a) from healthy to
sick (b) from rich to poor and (c) across life cycle
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There are two broad categories of argument in favor of risk pooling in health care, reflecting 
equity and efficiency considerations. The equity arguments reflect the view society does not feel 
that it is fair that individuals should assume all the risk associated with their health care 
expenditure needs. Instead, all or some of that risk should be spread across a given risk pool. 
This implies an equity objective of offering equal access to health care for members of the risk 
pool in equal need, regardless of their personal circumstances. 
 
In developing countries, the equity argument is particularly acute for two reasons. First, the 
pattern of burden of disease (still predominantly communicable diseases) is closely related to 
poverty: the poor (those least able to pay) are the ones most in need to treatment. Second, low 
absolute levels of income mean that even modest financial contributions can lead to inability to 
seek treatment or adverse consequences from seeking treatment (such as indebtedness or reduced 
expenditure on other essential items).  
 
As well as offending most people’s notion of fairness, an absence of risk pooling is likely to be 
inefficient. Most obviously, risk pooling transfers health care resources to the poor, who are at 
the margin likely to be able to benefit more from health care than the rich. Pooling therefore can 
lead to major improvements in the population’s health. Such health gain is likely to be desirable 
in its own right. Moreover, with no pooling, poorer citizens who could benefit from health care 
(and may thereby become more economically productive) might languish untreated and become 
a burden on society. Pooling can reduce or eliminate a large degree of uncertainty associated 
with health care expenditure, thereby leading to widespread improvements in individual utility.  
 
Treating and preventing communicable diseases is likely to be particularly efficient, both 
because of the high cost-efficiency of many interventions and the high returns to society. There 
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 are numerous positive externalities from increasing access to prevention and treatment, both in 
terms of limiting the spread of infectious diseases like tuberculosis, and in wider economic terms 
(such as improved returns on education and higher workforce productivity). 
APPROACHES TO RISK POOLING 
The nature of the risk pooling arrangements is a matter of policy choice, which will be heavily 
influenced by a nation’s circumstances and its policy priorities. In western European countries 
risk pools are frequently entire regions or nations, reflecting the equity objective of securing 
universal coverage, often referred to as the solidarity principle. In the US risk pools are more 
heterogeneous, being based on factors such as age (Medicare), poverty (Medicaid), or 
employment. In spite of the acute equity and efficiency considerations noted above, many 
developing countries attempt very little risk pooling. Government funds may provide a small 
subsidy to public facilities, but the bulk of health financing comes directly from households in 
the form either of user payments (officially sanctioned out-of-pocket fees) or, more commonly, 
informal payments (unofficial, non-regulated, but often crucial to the functioning of the health 
system). The World Development Indicators [7] show private health expenditure for 1990-8 as 
66 percent of the total in low income countries (reaching 77 percent in South Asia), compared 
with 37 percent for high income countries.  
 
There are essentially four classes of approach to risk pooling, considered in turn: no risk pool, 
unitary risk pool, fragmented risk pool, and integrated risk pools. 
NO RISK POOLING 
When there is no risk pooling, individuals are responsible for meeting their own health care costs 
as they arise. In its purest form, this entails patients’ meeting user charges as they are incurred, 
with no subsidy of prices for poorer people and denial of treatment when the patient lacks the 
financial means to pay.  
 
The large degree of uncertainty suffered by all citizens regarding future health care expenditure 
is likely to lead to high general dissatisfaction with the health care system. Some expenditure 
uncertainty associated with this arrangement can be removed using a competitive insurance 
market. Insurers will set individual premiums based on their assessment of an individual's risk 
profile. In these circumstances, the function of insurance is to eliminate the expenditure 
uncertainty associated with health care but not to transfer health care resources between 
individuals. In effect, as the ability to predict expenditure needs improves, such insurance 
becomes a method of prepayment for health care (rather than insurance), with the principal 
objective of smoothing known expenditure needs across a lifetime. The expenditure needs 
associated with individuals with different risk profiles cannot be pooled, otherwise the insurance 
plan becomes a risk pool, with equal premiums for different risks.  
 
Most private insurance arrangements use the citizen’s previous health record as an important 
element in setting a premium (experience rating). Thus, even if a current episode of health care 
is covered by an insurance contract, the patient may implicitly pay for the episode in the form of 
increased future insurance premiums. Indeed, many citizens will effectively become uninsurable 
for some or all health care risks in a system with no risk pooling. It is for example hard to 
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 imagine the bulk of AIDS patients in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia either being offered or being 
able to afford market-based insurance premiums. In practice, society might need to put in place 
some sort of health care for those unable to pay charges or insurance premiums, which in effect 
is a “safety net” risk pool comprising the poor and the sick. 
 
In many circumstances, private insurers who wish to charge risk-rated premiums are confronted 
by a profound lack of information about the health status of their applicants for coverage. If—for 
lack of this personal information—they are forced to charge a single premium to all insured, they 
create a risk pool and the problem of adverse selection arises. The premium reflects the average 
costs of health care. But individuals may be able to judge more accurately than the insurer 
whether their own risk is above average (the sick) or below average (the healthy). If such private 
information exists, the sick may purchase the insurance, the healthy may not. Thus, with 
voluntary enrolment, the insurance pool in time becomes less healthy, leading to increased 
premiums and in turn withdrawal of the comparatively healthy members of the remaining pool. 
The insurance function therefore breaks down, leading to market failure. 
 
In theory there may be ways in which private insurers can overcome the adverse selection 
problem [8]. For example two types of insurance contract might be offered. The first has a low 
premium but requires a significant co-payment on the part of the insured if any health care costs 
are incurred. The second requires a higher premium but no co-payment. It can be shown that, if 
there are only two types of individual (healthy and sick), healthy people will select the first type 
of insurance, sick people the second type. This leads to the creation of two risk pools based on 
health status. In practice, the situation is much more complex than this stylized example, and 
whether an insurance contract can designed to overcome the adverse selection problem is highly 
questionable.  
 
In the pursuit of equity objectives, many systems of health care insist that an insurer must charge 
all insureds within a risk pool the same premium (or the same rate of premium as applied to 
some measure of income or wealth) regardless of health risk. Under this regime, known as 
community rating, the insurer cannot discriminate on price, but instead has an incentive to cream 
skim the relatively healthy. Even if such cream-skimming is formally illegal, it is in practice 
difficult to prevent insurers from deterring sick applicants, or even from discriminating against 
those they assume to be high risk (e.g., AIDS orphans). In these circumstances, some individuals 
might become uninsurable, or insurers might withdraw from the market, in the extreme leading 
to insurance market failure. The problem of cream skimming under community rating 
arrangements will be exacerbated by any increased ability of insurers to distinguish between 
good and bad risks, brought about by developments such as genetic testing. 
 
A further inefficiency associated with an absence of risk pooling is caused by the transaction 
costs associated with calculating and collecting user charges (in a system with no insurance). A 
system using informal payments from patients directly to providers may in some circumstances 
economize on such costs but will give rise to profound inefficiencies and inequities in other 
aspects of system performance [9].  
 
With risk-rated health care insurance, the transaction costs include assessing an individual’s 
health care risks, writing appropriate insurance contracts, monitoring the individual’s utilization 
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 of health care, and reimbursing providers. In short, the information and auditing requirements of 
a health care system with no risk pooling may be considerable. Many forms of risk pooling may 
reduce the magnitude of such transaction costs. This is an important consideration for health 
systems in low income countries, which typically have low information technology and 
managerial capacities. 
 
Finally, by definition, any health care system that relies on individuals to make their own 
financial provision for health care expenditure will fail to address many issues of public health, 
which are a central concern in many low-income countries. A side effect of pooling is that the 
risk pool can act as a focus for programs related to population health that the individual or the 
private insurance market cannot address.2 
UNITARY RISK POOL 
Under the unitary risk pool, revenue (whether generated by general taxation, social insurance, 
health care insurance, or user charges) is placed in a single central pool that seeks to cover a 
chosen package of health care services. Payments are then made to providers in line with patient 
demands. Under the unitary model, risk pooling must be mandatory, in the sense that rich or 
healthy citizens cannot opt out of contributing. The mandatory risk pool is one possible policy 
response to counter the manifest inefficiencies and inequities associated with adverse selection, 
cream-skimming, and transaction costs.  
 
It is nevertheless not without its own potential inefficiencies. In particular, an important 
administrative function is then to ensure that all providers are offering uniform levels of care, in 
line with the chosen package. Unless systems of provider reimbursement are chosen carefully, 
there may be a strong incentive for supplier-induced demand [10]. As well as being inefficient, 
supplier induced demand may lead to variations in the package received, breaching many equity 
principles. Payment mechanisms can be introduced that reduce the incentive to induce supply 
such as shifting away from fee for service and informal fees toward block contracts. This may 
partly explain why many unitary risk pools such as those found in the former Soviet Union, have 
often been associated with fixed payment system such as salaries. Such mechanisms lead to their 
own difficulties such as supplier suppressed demand and assuring provider quality standards.  
 
Furthermore, because members of a unitary pool have little incentive to moderate their demands 
on health care resources, the potential exists for moral hazard, in the form of excessive 
consumption of health care resources. Unitary risk pooling removes the usual economic barrier 
of the price mechanism to consumption, and therefore carries with it the potential for use of 
health care in excess of the chosen package of care. In developed countries, this problem has 
been addressed by several instruments of managed care such as utilization review and health care 
gatekeepers [11]. 
 
In developing countries, the frequent presence of large indirect costs of health care consumption 
imposes considerable barriers to access for the poor. Attending health centers often entails 
considerable personal costs, in the form of lost income from work (especially in the case of day 
                                                 
2  Because of their public good characteristics, such programs are almost always provided free to the user, implying 
that any direct charging mechanism is likely to be ineffective. 
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 laborers and peasants), travel costs, and time spent getting to and waiting in health facilities. 
Even in the absence of direct charges, households are unlikely to make frivolous use of health 
services. A study of the cost-effectiveness of directly observed therapy short course treatment for 
tuberculosis patients in Pakistan found a correlation between economic status and drop-out rates. 
Although treatment was free, the time implications of attending clinics daily were serious, and it 
was found that the economically active were most likely to fail to complete the treatment [12]. 
Under these circumstances, the problem of moral hazard is manifested as a problem of inequity 
of access to the standard package of care, particularly for the poor and residents of rural areas. 
 
The notion of a compulsory risk pool carries with it an implication of a curtailment of individual 
choice about the nature of the package of health care made available. This can lead to 
inefficiencies in two ways: first, it may remove an element of competition from the supply of 
health care, and second it may prevent individuals from securing a package of care in line with 
their preferences for which they are willing to pay. These considerations have assumed 
preeminence in the debate over the reform of the U.S. health care system. In other contexts such 
as the transitional countries of the former Soviet bloc, the tension between the old traditions of 
solidarity and the new desire to enhance quality and responsiveness of services have led to a 
spectrum of pooling and financing arrangements. 
FRAGMENTED RISK POOLS  
In practice, pursuit of a pure unitary system of risk pooling is usually unfeasible and may be 
undesirable. Although a large unitary risk pool in principle effects complete risk sharing across a 
nation and minimizes variations in expected expenditure, it brings with it enormous practical 
difficulties associated with managerial control and coordination. As a result, almost all nations 
devolve health care purchasing arrangements to smaller organizations, so that the risk pool 
becomes fragmented. 
 
The potential for fragmentation occurs whenever more than one risk pool exists. Under these 
arrangements, individuals might be assigned to a particular pool depending on criteria such as: 
 
• Where they live (geographical risk pools) 
• The nature of their employment 
• Their personal characteristics such as age or health status 
• Their personal choice (e.g., competing insurance funds). 
 
Membership in a particular risk pool may be voluntary (as in the case of competitive insurers) or 
mandatory (as is usually the case with geographically defined risk pools). Society may 
nevertheless insist that all citizens are members of at least one pool. 
 
Fragmented risk pools will in general be of variable population size and imply variable per 
capita expected expenditure. Broadly speaking, pools with a higher proportion of older and 
sicker members will incur higher per capita expenditures. For example, the U.K. NHS is 
organized into about 100 geographical risk pools (known as health authorities) covering 
populations of about 500,000. It is estimated that—given the demographic and social 
characteristics of the population—the per capita spending needs to deliver a standard level of 
health care among the health authorities vary between 79.5 percent and 135.4 percent of the 
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 national average [13]. Similar variations are likely to be found when the fragmentation is based 
on employment, and the variation may be larger if based on age or health status.  
 
In general, a larger number of small risk pools will exhibit higher levels of variation in spending 
needs than a system with a small number of large risk pools. Furthermore, the level of 
uncertainty in predicting such needs will increases as the risk pool gets smaller, because of the 
increased importance of random fluctuations in the population at risk. Martin and others [14] 
show how, as individuals are amalgamated into a risk pool, and the size of the risk pool 
increases, the per capita random variation in expenditure reduces (figure 2). In the extreme, 
fragmented risk pools become households or individuals, and the system effectively becomes 
one of no risk pooling. 
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Figure 2: Shows 95% confidence intervals for actual acute sector
expenditure in relation to an annual budget as population size 
increases (England 1991/1992)
Budget = 1.0
Source: Martin, Rice and Smith, Social Science and Medicine (1998)
 
If left unadjusted, the variation in expenditure needs between risk pools is undesirable on both 
efficiency and equity grounds. The efficiency arguments are particularly important in 
competitive insurance systems, when variations in the per capita needs can lead to variations in 
insurance premiums unrelated to efficiency [15]. The competitive insurance market therefore 
breaks down unless corrective action is taken. The equity arguments are manifest. Fragmentation 
implies that pools with sicker, poorer memberships must charge higher premiums than their less 
disadvantaged counterparts. Both these problems have been addressed through the methods of 
risk-pool integration, discussed in the next section. 
 
An example of fragmented risk pools can be found in Austria, where health care is organized by 
sickness funds based on employment sector [16]. Revenues are generated by income-related 
social insurance payments by employers and employees to the relevant fund. Plans vary in both 
health care needs and revenue bases, and there is no formal attempt to effect transfers between 
plans. As a result, premium rates vary substantially between funds for both employers and 
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 employees. This sort of arrangement, with no transfers between risk pools, can be termed a pure 
fragmented system of risk pools.  
INTEGRATED RISK POOLS 
Whenever an attempt is made to devolve health care purchasing arrangements there is a danger 
that the risk pool will be fragmented, leading to the numerous adverse consequences for 
efficiency and equity (see also below). The policy response to the efficiency and equity problems 
brought about by fragmentation has been to develop the notion of integrated risk pools. Under 
this arrangement, the individual risk pools of the sort discussed above can remain in place, but 
financial transfers are arranged between pools so that some or all of the variation caused by pure 
fragmentation is eliminated. In this section we discuss the approaches to integration that have 
been adopted. 
 
If it is assumed that the health care system should deliver a standard package of care to all 
citizens, the most obvious cause of variations in the spending needs of fragmented risk pools is 
the size of the population covered. A first step toward integration is therefore to base funding of 
integrated risk pools on a capitation payment. This can be defined as the notional or actual 
contribution to a risk pool’s revenue associated with a particular pool member for a given period 
of time. In its simplest manifestation, a capitation system would give an equal per capita amount 
to each risk pool. While offering a rudimentary correction for variations in the size of pools, this 
approach fails to reflect any variations in per capita needs between pools. 
 
Many countries have therefore developed risk-adjustment methods, which alter the capitation 
payment associated with an individual, depending on the individual’s characteristics such as age, 
social circumstances, and health status [17]. A summary is given in the next section. The risk-
adjusted capitation scheme seeks to compensate risk pools for variations in exposure.  
 
The operation of a system of transfers between risk pools might take the form of central 
collection of revenues, and disbursement to risk pools on the basis of estimated spending need. 
In some systems, an equivalent mechanism is effected in the form of collection of revenues by 
the pools themselves, followed by financial transfers from low-need pools to high-need pools on 
the basis of needs, without the intervention of a central intermediary.  
 
If revenues (in the form of insurance premiums) are collected by the individual pools, a distinct 
issue is the extent to which they are compensated for variations in the revenues base. For 
example, if revenues take the form of a payroll tax proportional to income, then—for the same 
package of health care—pools with relatively large numbers of high-earning individuals and low 
numbers of non-earning dependants will be able to charge lower premium rates than their less 
well endowed counterparts.3 If this is considered unacceptable on payment equity grounds, a 
second set of transfers will be needed between pools to adjust for variations in revenue bases. 
The two sets of transfers correspond to the risk-pooling and income-redistribution functions 
noted in the previous section. Some transitional countries such as Estonia, which set up 
                                                 
3 Note in this section the distinction between a premium rate (the income per unit of the revenue base) and the 
premium (the amount paid by a particular member). Most systems of managed competition seek to secure equal 
premium rates, not equal per capita premiums.  
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 decentralized health insurance funds with local collection powers in the first wave of reforms, 
found it hard to equalize between wealthier and less well-off regions. This led to a re-reform in 
1994, with the establishment of a central sickness fund for tax collection, from which per capita 
allocation of funds could be made to local sickness funds.  
 
In practice, integration of the risk-pooling and income-redistribution payments can be effected 
simultaneously within a single payment system. If Ni indicates the total expected expenditure 
needs in pool i, and Bi is the revenue base for insurance premiums in pool i, then the policy 
objective is to secure an identical rate of premium r* for all pools. This is achieved by noting 
that—using this global premium rate—the difference between revenue and expenditure in pool i 
is r*Bi—Ni. This difference is the contribution of pool i to the risk-adjustment pool (which 
becomes a receipt if it takes a negative value). For a self-funding system of health care, r* must 
be chosen so that the sum of all receipts equals the sum of contributions to the risk-adjustment 
pool. 
 
In summary, as risk pooling becomes progressively more integrated, the uncertainty associated 
with health care expenditure can be reduced. This can be illustrated by means of the “integration 
pyramid” (figure 3). A system of out-of-pocket payments exposes individuals to the greatest 
level of uncertainty. Private insurance can smooth some variability, but with risk-rated premiums 
does little to compensate for variations in health status or income. Fragmented risk pools allow 
some local sharing of risk but continue to expose members to variations between risk pools. 
Integration seeks to reduce these variations, which are eliminated under a truly unitary system. 
Some of the rudimentary mathematics of risk pooling is discussed in the technical appendix. The 
many considerations other than risk sharing that influence the choice of risk-pooling 
arrangements are discussed in the following sections. 
 
Figure 3: The integration pyramid: as integration increases so
the degree of uncertainty borne by the individual decreases
Magnitude of individual uncertainty
Integration
Out of pocket payments
Private insurance
Fragmented risk pools
Integrated risk pools
Unitary risk pool
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 PRACTICAL ISSUES 
The discussion above suggests that—in principle—enormous efficiency and equity gains can be 
secured by well-designed risk-pooling arrangements. However, numerous practical issues arise 
in seeking to make the principles of risk pooling operational. This section discusses these issues 
under eight headings: the institutional framework for risk-pooling arrangements, membership 
criteria for risk pools, the size of the risk pools, setting capitation payments, variations in the 
benefit package, retrospective risk sharing, overlapping risk pools, and payment systems and risk 
sharing. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR RISK POOLING 
The most important imperatives for risk pooling are to establish appropriate and reliable systems 
of governance, to assure the collection and stewardship of finances, and to ensure the appropriate 
reimbursement of providers. These basic requirements are fundamental, and local conditions 
may seriously circumscribe realistic policy choices. They imply the need for a minimum degree 
of long-term trust in the institutions of health care, a rudimentary flow of adequate information, 
and the reliable enforcement of contracts, whether implicit or explicit. Without these desiderata, 
it is difficult to envisage the feasibility of any system of risk pooling and collective purchasing of 
health care.  
 
Once these basic institutional requirements are satisfied, numerous fundamental choices must be 
made about the type of risk pooling employed within a system of health care, including: 
 
• The institutional basis for risk pools (geography, employment sector, employment status, 
and so on)   
• The criteria for membership in a risk pool  
• The size of risk pools  
• Whether or not the risk pools are competitive  
• Whether or not contributions are mandatory  
• Whether financial contributions are community rated or risk rated  
• The extent to which health care users retain some expenditure risk (in the form of user 
charges)  
• The extent to which there are financial transfers between risk pools  
• The extent to which the risk pools are protected from unpredicted variations in 
expenditure needs by some higher level pooling  
• The freedom given to risk pools to choose variations in packages of care, membership 
entitlement, and financial contributions. 
 
A full discussion of all of these issues is unfeasible, although we discuss some of the more 
important ones in the following sections. The choice will frequently be heavily dependent on the 
administrative structures already in place, the nature of governance structures, managerial and 
informational capacity, and societal preferences. 
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 MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA FOR RISK POOLS 
It may be necessary to give careful consideration to criteria for membership in a risk pool. Where 
pools are defined by geographical residence or employment sector, these may be reasonably 
unambiguous. However, establishing membership status may be less straightforward if 
membership (or premium payments) are based on factors such as income, wealth, health status, 
or employment status.  
 
If insurance is voluntary, “safety net” arrangements must be made for catastrophic health care 
costs borne by the uninsured (leading to the creation of an implicit safety net for the poor). If the 
rich are able to “opt out” of contributing to public health insurance and take up private insurance 
in its place, the financial viability of (and political support for) the public risk pool may be 
threatened. Where the public risk pool is able to provide only a limited package of care, a more 
stable solution is to allow those who so wish to take out supplementary private insurance, but to 
insist that all citizens contribute to the public risk pool. 
 
Under competitive insurance with mandatory enrolment, mechanisms are required to ensure that 
citizens are members of one (and only one) risk pool. The informational and policing 
requirements of some of these risk-pooling arrangements may preclude their use in many 
settings. 
SIZE OF THE RISK POOLS 
The optimal size of risk pools is a central design consideration. The choice will to some extent 
be dependent on the purposes of the risk-pooling scheme. For example, the nature of the health 
care package under consideration has important implications for risk pooling. If it is confined to 
relatively routine care of common conditions, expenditure is predictable, and care can be 
delivered at a local level, so small risk pools may be satisfactory. However, coverage of less 
common, more expensive care may require pooling at a higher level to ensure that random 
expenditure variation can be managed and providers can be properly regulated.  
 
Small risk pools introduce important additional managerial incentives that may adversely affect 
system performance in terms of both equity and efficiency, particularly if the pools are subject to 
very “hard” budget constraints [18]. These arise because the importance of the unpredictable 
random element of expenditure grows as the size of the risk pool contracts. In these 
circumstances: 
 
• Small risk pools that perceive that their expenditure will fall below their budget may 
“spend up” to protect their budgetary position in future years. 
• Risk pools that perceive that their expenditure will exceed their budget may be thrown 
into crisis, leading perhaps to serious unplanned rationing, as they seek to conform to the 
budget. 
• Patients may be treated inequitably. Different small risk pools will be under different 
budgetary pressures, and so may adopt different treatment practices. Moreover, within a 
risk pool, choice of treatment may vary over the course of a year if the risk pool’s 
perception of its budgetary position changes. 
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 • Risk pools may adopt a variety of defensive stratagems such as cream skimming or 
insuring with a third party against overspending their budget. 
 
The nature and magnitude of these managerial responses will depend heavily on the nature of 
ownership and governance arrangements in place. They impose implicit or explicit costs on the 
system which need to be weighed against any benefits brought about by devolving responsibility 
to small risk pools. 
 
The potentially dysfunctional influences of small risk pools can be abated by stratagems such as: 
 
• Amalgamating risk pools. Budgets become less susceptible to random per capita 
variations as the population to which they refer increases. There is therefore a strong 
argument for allocating a joint budget to voluntary associations of risk pools that wish to 
share managerial responsibilities.  
• Pooling years. In the same way, random fluctuations become less important as the time 
period associated with a budget increases. Risk pool budgets may be more meaningful if 
they refer to a period longer than the conventional one-year planning horizon. Even if 
budgets cannot be set for periods longer than a year, arrangements for carrying forward 
surpluses or deficits to future years may be helpful. 
• Excluding predictably expensive patients. A small number of patients with serious 
chronic conditions may account for a large proportion of expenditure, making a 
significant contribution to the unpredictable variation in expenditure. Where the 
condition is readily verified, there may be an argument for transferring budgetary 
responsibility to a higher level risk pool. 
• Excluding certain procedures or services. In the same way, certain procedures such as 
those relating to severe mental illness, though rare, may have important implications for 
budgetary control where they occur. Consideration might therefore be given to 
transferring all or part of the costs of such procedures to a higher level risk pool.  
• Retention of a contingency fund. Some risk pools will overspend their budgets, others 
will underspend. There may therefore be a case for “top-slicing” a certain amount from 
all budgets at the start of the period to create a contingency fund with which to cover 
high-spending risk pools. This means that all budgets will appear relatively “tight” at the 
start of the period. 
• Careful analysis of variations from budgets. The above discussion indicates that—before 
any action can be taken—careful examination of the causes of variations from budgets is 
essential. This might entail installation of useful and timely information systems and 
audit systems, as well as some sort of peer review. 
 
An important associated consideration is the managerial cost associated with running alternative 
risk-pooling arrangements. A system of competitive insurance is likely to be particularly 
demanding in terms of information flows and monitoring. A plurality of risk pools imposes a 
burden in terms of transferring payments to providers, and collecting premiums, as well as the 
need to arrange interpool financial transfers. A system of larger, noncompetitive risk pools might 
be appropriate in circumstances where information and managerial resources are poor.  
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 The choice of risk-pooling arrangement may be influenced by levels and distribution of income, 
and the nature and magnitude of potential revenue bases. If these vary substantially, big interpool 
transfers may be needed, and a strong central coordination role is indicated. Paradoxically, this 
requirement is likely to be particularly important in a system in which there has been substantial 
purchasing devolution to a large number of small risk pools. If, on the other hand, risk pools 
have roughly similar per capita income and needs, a less integrated system may suffice. 
 
In summary, there is likely to be a trade-off between the size of the pools and the complexity of 
the managerial, purchasing, governance, and stewardship functions (figure 4). Equity gains (from 
pooling) must be traded off against efficiency losses [19]. The shape of the curves, and therefore 
optimal size, will depend on local circumstances and preferences. 
 
Figure 4: As population size increases, risk pooling performance
improves: however managerial efficiency declines beyond a 
certain point.  Optimal size is at S*
Population size
Health System
“Performance”
S*
Risk pooling
Managerial
efficiency
Total system
performance
 
 
SETTING CAPITATION PAYMENTS 
In most systems of health care, it will be unfeasible and undesirable to implement a pure unitary 
risk pool. Instead, some form of fragmentation is inevitable, and the issue then how much 
integration can be secured. Depending on the information resources available, this integration 
might, in the first instance, have to be rudimentary, but any move toward integration is likely to 
have considerable benefits in terms of shifting resource toward poorer, less healthy populations. 
 
A number of methods of integrating risk pools through capitation can be found in developed 
nations [17]. The level of sophistication of the risk-adjustment process varies considerably 
between countries and is highly contingent on information availability. In Spain, the payment is 
equal for all citizens, and no attempt is made to adjust for variations in per capita needs. In the 
U.K. NHS, on the other hand, risk adjustment has evolved into a highly elaborate set of formulas 
based on demographic and social characteristics of the risk pool [20]. Perhaps the most advanced 
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 approach to risk adjustment is found in Stockholm County, where 51 distinct capitation 
payments have been developed, with the magnitude of the annual payment depending on an 
individual's age, gender, marital status, housing tenure, and employment status [21]. 
 
In Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Israel, and many other countries that have 
sought to introduce competitive health care insurance markets, it is recognized that sickness 
funds with low health care risk profiles and strong resource bases are able to charge low 
insurance premiums, and therefore have a competitive advantage that is unrelated to their own 
performance [15]. If left unadjusted, this arrangement offers funds a powerful incentive to 
creamskim members who are healthy, have high incomes, and low numbers of nonearning 
dependants. The implementation of risk-adjustment schemes is therefore imperative to 
compensate plans for variations in their risk profiles and revenue bases. In effect, the intention of 
integration is to enable all plans to levy a standard premium rate if they deliver a standard 
package of care at a standard level of efficiency, thereby securing a system of integrated risk 
pools.  
 
Many of the systems of “managed competition” between health insurers are in practice highly 
regulated and offer the plans little scope to secure efficiency improvements from providers, who 
continue to be reimbursed on the basis of activity [22, 23]. This lack of leverage in pursuing 
provider efficiency increases the incentive for plans to target their energies either toward the 
socially wasteful activity of cream-skimming, or toward the inefficient practice of quality 
skimping (for example, delivering less than the socially desirable level of care to high-need 
patients). In these circumstances, the purpose of capitation and risk adjustment is to seek to 
reduce the manifest inefficiencies that emerge. The many interesting efficiency issues that 
emerge when seeking to implement a competitive insurance market are discussed in more detail 
elsewhere [15, 24-30]. 
 
In most of Scandinavia, health care is organized at the local government level [31]. It is financed 
partly by central government grant-in-aid and partly by local taxation and user charges. Because 
the central grant is fixed, marginal expenditure must be raised from these two local sources. The 
central government grant therefore seeks to enable municipalities to deliver a standard package 
of care at a standard rate of local tax and user charges, and therefore fulfils both a risk-
adjustment and an income-redistribution role. However, local governments are to some extent 
free to choose the package of care offered and local tax and user charge levels. The intention of 
the risk adjustment is therefore to offer local communities the opportunity to deliver a standard 
package of care. However, the residual freedom for the pool to vary from that standard means 
that this is in effect a system of fragmented risk pools which is only partially compensated.  
 
In most centrally planned systems such as those found in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and 
many Canadian and Australian states, fragmentation takes place in the form of budgetary 
devolution to local risk pools based on geography. Revenues are generated centrally, so that 
there is no requirement for any formal income redistribution mechanism. However, there will in 
general be an important need to adjust for differences in health care need profiles, so that a 
standard package of care can be offered in every area. 
16 
 VARIATIONS IN THE BENEFIT PACKAGE 
The definition of the health care benefit package covered by insurance arrangements has become 
a highly sensitive and unresolved political issue in many developed nations. It represents a form 
of deliberate or planned rationing of health care. Yet finding a satisfactory package definition is 
important, particularly when unitary and integrated risk-pooling arrangements are sought, as 
variations in the available package compromise the desired equity objectives. Furthermore, 
particularly in low-income countries, specification of the benefit package will be an essential 
step in ensuring that the chosen health care system is within the nation’s means.  
 
In an environment where finances are insufficient to cover all health care, there is an important 
continuing debate concerning the balance between insuring minor as opposed to catastrophic 
risks. The Primary Health Care approach focused on prevention and minor, treatable ailments, 
and made the case that this was both efficient and equitable. Recently, a number of authors have 
tried to refocus on services for which there is high demand and have raised the question of 
whether it may be more important to protect against infrequent, but potentially catastrophic risks. 
These questions are not readily resolved from an equity point of view. Minor health expenditure 
probably forms the bulk of household expenditure on health care. Shifting coverage to higher 
cost services increases the possibility that benefits are captured disproportionately by the urban 
elite, who live closer to secondary and tertiary facilities. On the other hand, it is also true that 
high-cost health events might disproportionately affect poorer households. 
 
While both developing and transitional countries aspire toward guaranteeing access to a wide 
range of services, problems in funding give rise to three possible outcomes. 
 
• In the first, a wide range of services continues to be offered, but quality drops, so that 
patients are obliged to pay for a range of inputs, from top-up payments to staff to drugs, 
food, and so on. This is common in developing and transitional countries.  
• In the second, the basic package of services on offer is narrowed to an “essential 
package” of services. This was the recommendation of the World Bank in its 1993 World 
Development Report on Health, in which burden of disease and cost-effectiveness of 
interventions were used to draw up suggested minimum preventive and clinical service 
packages. The implication of this is that any wider services are to be purchased in private 
health markets. A number of countries have tried introducing explicit “essential service 
packages” in recent years. These raise a number of issues such as their practicality (for 
example, can cross subsidies between services inside and outside the package be 
avoided?). However, it is too early to draw firm conclusions.  
• The third option is to keep the same breadth of services but to narrow the range of 
beneficiaries—targeting those under a certain income level, for example, with the 
remainder forced to pay out of pocket or seek private insurance to cover their needs. An 
example from the developed world is the attempted targeting of the aboriginal population 
in New South Wales [32]. In England, a recent attempt to direct resource allocation 
toward “reducing avoidable health inequalities” similarly implies a targeting of certain 
resources toward the less healthy [33]. Such strategies raise enormous practical 
difficulties, and in developing countries resource allocation remains, if anything, skewed 
toward the better-off rather than the poorest. 
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We have hitherto usually assumed that the benefit package to be delivered must be uniform 
across risk pools. In fact, if the integration of risk pools is imperfect, they will in general be 
unable to offer a uniform package. One of the responses of the relatively underfunded pools may 
be to alter the package of benefits available, even if—in principle—the health care system seeks 
to avoid such inequalities. Variations in the package may take the form of prohibition of certain 
treatments or drugs, poorer quality care (in the form of longer waits, for example), poorer quality 
facilities (in the form of location or physical condition), or a reduction in patient choice. 
 
In some systems of competitive health care insurance (as in parts of the United States), such 
variations may be legitimate, and potential members may be offered a trade-off between the 
extent of the benefit package and the premium paid. Similarly, in systems of local government–
based health care, some elements of the package may be subject to local discretion. In all 
systems of health care, some variation in the package (for example between rural and urban 
areas) may be practically inevitable. However, many systems of health care seek to offer a 
uniform package, and reductions in such variations are a policy objective. 
 
If risk pools have the freedom to vary the benefit package, this does not necessarily preclude 
risk-adjusted capitation methods. The focus of the capitation scheme becomes one of offering the 
risk pools the opportunity to offer a standard package at a standard premium (as in the local 
government example above). Alternatively, receipt of certain parts of the capitation payment 
may become conditional on the risk pool’s offering some part of the benefit package. This 
splitting of the total capitation payment between risk pools may become essential in systems in 
which two or more risk pools share the responsibility for covering individuals (see overlapping 
risk pools, below). 
 
When the resources of a risk pool come under strain, the risk pool may have to ration access to 
health care and set priorities for access. Treatment may be delayed or refused, even when it falls 
within the package. Such unplanned rationing decisions will often appear arbitrary and unfair (in 
the United Kingdom, they have become known as “postcode rationing”). In developing 
countries, unplanned rationing is common and generally results from budgetary shortfalls, 
unpaid salaries, and drug consignments that do not arrive on time. Unplanned rationing is likely 
to be particularly prevalent in systems with a large number of small risk pools, as the high 
random variability in per capita expenditure in such pools increases the probability that 
budgetary constraints may become binding. 
RETROSPECTIVE RISK SHARING 
Prospective risk adjustment between risk pools is usually only the first stage of the resource 
allocation process. It is almost invariably accompanied by a retrospective stage, in which 
prospective allocations are altered in the light of actual expenditure experience. A number of 
arrangements exist for handling retrospectively variations in actual expenditure from the 
prospective budget. These include: 
 
• Renegotiating the budget retrospectively with the central payer (as effectively occurred 
for many years in Italy and Spain) 
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 • Running down (or contributing to) the plan’s reserves (as in many systems of competitive 
insurance funds)  
• Varying the future premiums or local taxes paid by the plan members (as in Scandinavia 
and some competitive insurance systems)  
• Varying the user charges paid by the patients (as in Finland) 
• Varying the package of benefits available to patients 
• Delaying or rationing health care to the population at risk (as occurs to differing extents 
in the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden).  
 
These arrangements might exist in any system of fragmented risk pools and are particularly 
important when their size is small (and pools are therefore vulnerable to random fluctuation in 
demand). They imply important differences in the “hardness” of the fragmentation and suggest 
that—to differing extents—the apparently scientific methods (such as capitation) used to finance 
health care purchasers might be tempered by many other methods of resource allocation, both 
prospective and retrospective. As a consequence, the extent to which the financial resources 
ultimately available to risk pools have been determined by some objective assessment of needs 
varies considerably between systems. 
OVERLAPPING RISK POOLS 
So far the discussion has assumed that an individual is a member of a single risk pool—however 
defined. In many systems of health care, there may exist overlapping risk pools. For example, in 
the United States it is common to find that health care costs associated with particular conditions 
(such as mental illness or end-stage renal failure) are “carved out” of regular risk pools, and 
placed in a condition-specific risk pool [34]. The intention is to remove very unpredictable but 
high-cost needs from the regular health care pool and to transfer the associated risk to a higher 
level of aggregation (for example, from state to federal level). In a similar vein, individuals with 
particular chronic conditions might be carved out of the regular risk pool and pooled at a higher 
level to protect relatively small pools from catastrophic calls on their funds.  
 
Intermediate arrangements are also common under which the low-level pool shares the costs of 
certain elements of health care with a higher level pool. This is the arrangement in place for 
inpatient care in Norway, the marginal costs of which are shared between the national and the 
local government. In many systems of health care (such as France) the state offers a basic 
package of health care that citizens can choose to augment with supplemental (private) benefits 
insurance. The renegotiation of devolved budgets with a central payer is also in effect a cost 
sharing arrangement of this sort, albeit of a rather less structured format. 
 
At the other extreme, systems in which patients are liable for significant charges imply that the 
risk is shared between the pool and the individual. In effect, some of the risk borne by the pool is 
shifted downward to the individual. Similarly, arrangements under which citizens can take out 
supplementary private insurance give rise to a complex rearrangement of risk sharing. For 
example, in the United Kingdom, some private insurers offer their members side-payments if 
they agree to forgo a claim and instead wait for public NHS treatment. 
 
Singapore is an example of a system where minor and higher cost risks have been separated and 
financed through different mechanisms. Individual medical savings accounts (Medisave) provide 
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 intertemporal spread for some ambulatory and minor hospital expenditures, while a national 
catastrophic illness insurance scheme (Medishield) covers prolonged and expensive treatment 
(financed by employee contributions, often taken from the Medisave accounts). The first 
involves no direct risk pooling; the second does pool risks. In addition, there is a complex system 
of co-payments and deductibles, which involve direct out-of-pocket private payments. However, 
the context of Singapore is not typical, and even there the state continues to fund 30 percent of 
health expenditure [3, 35]. 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND RISK SHARING 
Up to now the discussion has focused on the health care purchaser as a risk pool. It implicitly 
assumes that a purchaser will be charged by providers for the health care utilization of its risk 
pool on a fee-for-service basis (effectively, a spot market in provision). However, other possible 
charging mechanisms exist, and the risk borne by the risk pool can be profoundly affected by its 
contractual relationship with providers.  
 
At one extreme, the purchaser might negotiate a block contract with an independent provider, 
which implies that the provider will give all necessary care to pool members for a fixed sum, 
regardless of the volume or severity of demands. This arrangement effectively shifts the relevant 
part of the risk pool from the purchaser to the provider. Such “provider risk pools” comprise the 
sum of all purchaser risk pools with which it has contracts. The use of block contracts might be a 
particularly effective means of aggregating a number of small purchaser risk pools.  
 
There exist numerous mechanisms for reimbursing providers that are intermediate between the 
fee-for-service arrangement (under which all risk remains with the purchaser) and the block 
contract (under which all risk is transferred to the purchaser). A modest transfer of risk from 
purchaser to provider occurs when a fixed price per case (e.g., in the form of a diagnosis related 
group payment) is substituted for fee for service. The risk associated with the incidence of a case 
remains with the purchaser. However, the risk associated with variations in treatment costs is 
transferred to the provider.  
 
An alternative intermediate risk-sharing arrangement might entail a cost-sharing arrangement 
between purchaser and provider. For example, the purchaser might agree to reimburse 50 percent 
of the provider’s incremental costs once activity exceeds a certain threshold. Or perhaps the 
provider might be prepared to take on greater risk (in the form of block contracts) in exchange 
for a longer term contract [36]. The United Kingdom has had a particularly rich experience of 
experimentation with contractual form in this vein, although the lack of serious penalties for 
breach of contract has inhibited careful evaluation [37]. 
 
The choice of contractual form (implicit or explicit) between insurer and provider has many 
ramifications beyond the sharing of risk. For example, at least in the short term, the block 
contract arrangement removes the price incentive for insurers to restrain the demand for health 
care among its members but gives providers an incentive to skimp on care. The fee-for-service 
arrangement leads to an incentive for supplier-induced demand. Considerations such as these 
must also be taken into account when choosing the optimal level of risk sharing between insurer 
and provider. 
 
20 
 Most developed nations have separated the purchaser and provider function in the belief that this 
arrangement leads to efficiency gains. The driving force behind such separation has been the 
desire to develop a market in providers, which can lead to all the putative benefits associated 
with market competition. In practice, the merits of creating markets in health care provision are 
still the subject of debate [38]. However, the separation of purchasing and provision appears to 
be an enduring result of reforms in many countries [39]. 
 
In contrast, in many developing countries the purchasing and provider functions continue to be 
vertically integrated, in the sense that insurance and provision function are not separated, and an 
implicit block contract between the two is therefore in place. For example, a community-
financed health center might both collect premiums and provide care for its locality. Vertical 
integration may result in some loss of incentives for provider efficiency. However the separation 
of purchaser and provider imposes a considerable managerial and informational burden on the 
health care system, so integration may be desirable where managerial capacity is limited. 
Furthermore, if open access to a provider is guaranteed for all in the locality, vertical integration 
is an implicit way of creating a local risk pool.  
 
The role of the provider becomes crucial when revenue is raised in the form of user charges. The 
provider must either collect the charge directly from the patient or ensure that accurate charging 
information is passed to the risk-pool management. In either case, important transaction costs 
arise in enforcing payment. Additional transaction costs might arise in auditing the probity of the 
provider if some or all of the charge is to be remitted to a central agency. 
RISK POOLING IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 
Where it exists, risk pooling in low- and middle-income countries has usually been partial and 
fragmented. For example, in some Latin American countries such as Argentina (before its 
reforms in the late 1990s), coverage by health insurance was organized through professional 
associations. In this case, risks varied between pools according to the nature of their members’ 
work. Many in the informal sector—often poorer and with higher health risks—were not covered 
by these risk-pooling arrangements. 
 
In other countries, like Indonesia, social insurance coverage is a perk offered to public sector 
workers. While this arrangement reflects practical factors—it is harder to collect contributions 
from small-scale and informal enterprises—it can have a regressive effect, with the relatively 
better-off receiving higher quality services with some degree of public subsidy. Industrial 
countries, like South Korea, which started a scheme for civil servants in 1977, have now 
managed to extend coverage to 94 percent of the population [40]. Others, like the Philippines, 
have lower coverage rates of around 40 percent for payroll insurance, probably reflecting the 
different employment structure and level of development of the country. A number of African 
countries, like Burundi and Namibia, that introduced insurance for public sector workers in the 
1980s, continue to have very low coverage, around 10 to 15 percent. There is some correlation—
though by no means perfect—between levels of coverage and per capita income (table 1). 
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 Table 1. Introducing Social Health Insurance in Low- and Middle-Income Countries 
Region Year introduced Coverage 
Per capita income
(US $) 
Africa    
Key feature:  Gradual introduction for civil servants and formal sector 
Burundi 1984 10-15 % 150  
Kenya 1960s 25 % 260  
Namibia 1980s 10 % 2,030  
    
Eastern Europe & FSU    
Key feature:  Transition from tax funded to social insurance 
Estonia 1992 94 % 2,820  
Hungary 1992 Higha 3,840  
Russia 1991 Higha 1,910  
Slovenia 1993 Higha 7,140  
    
Asia    
Key feature (transitional):  Response to declining level of state funding 
Kazakhstan 1995 70-80% 1,110  
Vietnam 1993 10 % 200  
Key feature (other):  Expansion a response to the growth of the economy 
Indonesia 1968 13 % 790  
Thailand 1990 13 % 2,210  
South Korea 1977 94 % 8,220  
    
Latin America & Caribbean    
Key feature:  Introduced from 1920s as part of wider package of pensions, unemployment and other benefits 
El Salvador 1960s 11 % 1,480  
Argentina 1920s 90 % 8,060  
Mexico 1930s 42 % 4,010  
Bolivia 1930s 18 % 770  
Paraguay 1930s 14 % 1,570  
a. Introduced from a 100 percent universal tax funded base—coverage thought to be falling as nonworking lose 
effective entitlement. 
Source: From Witter, et al. [41] 
 
The extent of private insurance is less clearly related to income than to the historic development 
of health markets. Latin America has relatively high rates of supplementary private health 
insurance (e.g., around 27 percent in Chile), whereas fast-growing Asian economies such as 
Malaysia and Singapore remain around the 3 to 4 percent [42].  
 
22 
 The failure of social and private insurance programs to achieve coverage beyond 20 percent of 
the population has renewed interest in smaller scale risk pooling such as community financing 
initiatives. Schemes like the Bamako Initiative, which was widely promoted in the early 1990s, 
tend to pool finance regionally. This may increase quality of service, and hence sometimes 
utilization, but also carries a number of dangers. The first is that it is not common to find 
interregional cross-subsidies between poorer and richer areas. The second is that distortions may 
occur in the service pattern, related to payment methods. In China and Vietnam, for example, 
allowing commune health staff to raise revenue from sales of drugs led, not surprisingly, to a 
large increase in drug prescriptions [43]. Another issue is the impact on the poorest. Since 
contributions must be levied in some form, a number of studies have highlighted the difficulty of 
reaching the poorest, who may lose out (to the moderately poor) on the introduction of such 
schemes [44]. The goals of financial sustainability of a scheme and reaching the poorest often 
conflict. 
 
A survey of community finance schemes from a number of countries highlights some successes 
and failures (table 2). There are a number of tensions—for example, between encouraging local 
ownership by allowing payments and benefits to vary by region, and tolerating a proportion of 
failures, as schemes fail to attract members or cannot pay for the range of promised benefits. 
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Countries like China and Vietnam illustrate a reversal of the expected trend, in which health 
financing arrangements move from no risk sharing, to small risk pools, and thence to larger, and 
more integrated risk pools. Both went from systems with universal (or nearly universal), free 
coverage (in the 1970s and 1980s) to ones where households bore the brunt of health care (in the 
1990s). They are now making slow progress toward developing both mandatory and voluntary 
risk-pooling systems [45]. 
 
In transitional countries, a number of risk-pooling mechanisms either remain from Soviet times 
or have been developed over the recent period of health sector reform. For example, in many 
former Soviet republics, local budgets finance a portion of health costs (such as capital 
expenditure, or coverage for certain population groups such as the unemployed and children), 
while social insurance contributions are supposed to pay for a guaranteed package of services for 
the rest of the population. In practice, in spite of arrangements for integrating revenue pools, one 
or both sources of finance may not be realized, leading to financial crisis and distorted 
expenditure patterns that compromise efficiency. In both developing and transitional countries, a 
common response to financial crisis is for staff salaries to continue to be paid, while funds for 
supplies are cut, seriously compromising staff productivity.  
 
Drugs pose a particular challenge for risk-pooling arrangements. The bulk of household 
expenditures on health care in low-income countries is spent on drugs. More than 80 percent of 
drug expenditures are private in low-income countries, according to World Bank estimates. [46] 
Risk-pooling arrangements should, in principle, cover the cost of drugs, but in practice they are 
often excluded. In Turkmenistan, for example, when health insurance was introduced in the mid-
1990s, drug expenditure was fully reimbursable [47]. Because of rapid price escalation, this gave 
rise to a swift depletion of the health funds, and full reimbursement for drugs was subsequently 
removed from the benefit package. Some schemes cover in-patient but not outpatient drugs. This 
disparity can have adverse consequences for other policies such as reducing length of stay and 
reducing hospital utilization for minor ailments. Managing demand is often more difficult for 
drugs than for other health care technologies, so some element of copayments is probably 
necessary in most health systems, in conjunction with exemptions for the poor and an active 
regulatory policy that reduces the use of medicines that are not cost-effective.  
 
In practice, almost all systems of health care contain elements of unitary pooling, elements of 
fragmentation, and elements where individuals continue to bear some risk associated with health 
care needs. However, important differences between systems exist in the emphasis attached to 
these approaches to risk pooling. In developing countries, a number of issues need to be 
addressed: 
 
• The lack of risk pooling in general, with a high (and in many cases increasing) reliance 
on direct contributions from households. Jowett [48] points out that private spending in 
low-income countries accounts for just under 60 percent of total health care 
expenditure—a marked increase on the 35 percent in 1990. There is considerable 
regional variation, ranging from 55 percent in Africa and 72 percent in Asia. He 
concludes that government expenditure is being substituted by private spending, even 
where economies are growing. 
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• Where risk pools occur, they tend to be small, based either on occupation (e.g., health 
insurance for public servants) or location (e.g., community financing initiatives). 
• The ability to equalize funds across regions of differing funding capacities is poor. 
Typically large cities with a strong economy have a better network of staff and facilities 
and higher quality of service. This results mainly from higher private revenue generation 
by facilities but is also reinforced by disproportionate amounts of public funding. 
Decentralization programs can reinforce the political and financial autonomy of different 
regions [49]. 
• At the same time, few countries have a resource allocation system based on needs. 
Funding typically follows a historical pattern or is based on existing physical and human 
infrastructure. In other words, instead of opposing discrepancies, it often rewards them. 
Where resource allocation formulas have been introduced—for example, in South 
Africa—it has offered an opportunity to reexamine wider resource allocation issues (such 
as the allocation to primary facilities) [50].  
LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
Any assessment of the effectiveness of risk-pooling arrangements depends on the relative weight 
attached to health system objectives—particular those relating to equity and efficiency—which 
must be a matter for local choice. Therefore it is highly unlikely that a single risk-pooling model 
would be appropriate for all nations, even if the economic and social circumstances of nations 
were very similar. In addition, important economic, geographical, cultural, financial, historical, 
and social make alternative arrangements more effective in some contexts than others. In short, 
system design may be highly contingent on local considerations. These might include: 
 
• Preference for equity of payment 
• Preference for equity of access 
• Potential sources of revenues 
• Ease of collecting revenues (taxes, premiums, user charges) 
• Efficiency and probity of managerial function 
• Nature of existing organizational structure (e.g., local government) 
• Nature of existing information bases 
• Nature, organization, governance, and ownership of providers 
• Nature of available health technologies 
• Nature of major health priorities (e.g., AIDS vs infant mortality) 
• Size and geography of the country. 
 
Risk pooling has two distinct purposes: the reduction of individual uncertainty associated with 
health care needs (an efficiency issue), and a transfer of health care resources between 
individuals (an equity issue). Communities will differ in the importance they attach to transfers 
of this sort. Local preferences should therefore be important considerations in system design, 
indicating that choice of risk-pooling arrangements is not just a technical issue. 
 
More generally, the cultural environment might have a central influence on system choice. West 
European nations have a tradition of solidarity in health care, which makes it possible to effect 
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large transfers between rich and poor, and healthy and sick, which appear to be unattainable in 
(say) the United States. In the same way, some countries may find (say) interregional transfers 
unfeasible, with important implications for risk-pooling arrangements. 
 
The experience in transitional economies has emphasized the need to put in place risk-pooling 
arrangements that enjoy the trust and support of the population. If there is widespread resistance 
to the stewardship arrangements, premiums may be difficult to collect, and the rich may opt out 
of risk-pooling contributions, for example, by purchasing private insurance. If occurring on a 
sufficiently large scale, such activity might lead to a breakdown of the risk-pooling function. 
Systems of auditing and assuring financial probity are particularly important in a climate where 
officials are prone to individual opportunistic behavior. Where direct financial transfers to risk 
pools are unfeasible, transfers in kind may nevertheless be possible through (say) the central 
provision of capital infrastructure or personnel. 
 
Risk pools require an organizational structure, and using any structures already in place will 
often be more efficient than starting from scratch. For example, local government, charitable, or 
employer structures that enjoy popular support can readily serve as the basis for collecting 
premiums and paying and supervising providers. Thus, while efficiency and equity 
considerations might suggest a particular form of risk pooling, this choice might be tempered by 
the constraints and opportunities offered by existing organizational structures. 
 
The design of risk-pooling arrangements may be heavily influenced by the nature of existing 
provider organizations. In some circumstances, existing publicly owned institutions such as a 
network of health centers, can form a natural basis for community-financed geographically 
defined risk pools. In other circumstances, providers may be predominantly unregulated and 
entrepreneurial, and a more formal system of purchaser-provider contracts may be required. 
 
Geography can have a profound impact on the choice of risk-pooling arrangement. For example, 
if development of rural health care is a priority, it would seem sensible to design a system in 
which separate urban and rural risk pools are established, with a robust revenue transfer 
mechanism to ensure that rural areas have access to a secure stream of finance that is not at risk 
from increased demands from their urban counterparts. 
 
Notwithstanding these cautions, the preceding discussion suggests some possible universal 
indicators of the success of risk pool integration arrangements: 
 
• Insurance coverage. The proportion of the population covered by health insurance 
arrangements 
• Insurance premiums. The extent of any differences in the premiums paid by identical 
individuals in different risk pools; 
• Variations in the care package. The extent of any differences between risk pools in the 
package of health care for which insured individuals are covered 
• Variations in quality. The extent of any qualitative differences in health care received by 
members of different risk pools, for example in the form of waiting time variations 
• Variations in user charges. The extent of any differences between risk pools in the out-
of-pocket charges to individuals in receipt of health care. 
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Some observed variations between pools may be due to factors other than risk-pool 
fragmentation, such as variations in the efficiency of the management, or legitimate local choice 
(such as in integrated local government systems). However, large variations in indicators such as 
these may also offer strong prima facie evidence of fragmentation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This report has sought to demonstrate that risk-pooling arrangements have important 
implications for health system behavior and may profoundly affect the purchasing function. 
Fragmentation of risk pools through devolution poses particular dangers. In developing 
countries, with high burdens of disease, particularly among the poor, and poor mechanisms for 
transfer of wealth, there are therefore strong reasons to believe that the trend should be toward 
larger risk pools than exist at present. Ideally, these would embrace mandatory, universal 
coverage, in which contributions are either income or community rated and where there is some 
mechanism for equalization between pools. In practice, the trend has been in the opposite 
direction, with many countries devolving health care arrangements to local levels and not 
implementing any risk-pool integration.  
 
Current evidence suggests not only that households are increasingly paying directly for health 
services in developing countries but also that informal payments may make up the bulk of these 
payments. In Bangladesh, unofficial payments outnumber official by a factor of five [51]. This 
payment mechanism is among the least effective from a risk-pooling point of view.  Systematic 
transfers from low to high risk or from rich to poor are unlikely, and there is also no 
intertemporal pooling for individuals. Indeed, individuals face uncertainty over payments for a 
single episode of illness, as the rates are not fixed or established in advance. Informal payments 
can be likened to a blind auction, with patients unsure how much they need to pay to get the 
quality they seek. 
 
The World Health Report 2000 emphasized the role of government in terms of “stewardship” of 
the health sector [5]. This attractive vision of a far-sighted and public-spirited regulatory 
capacity is hard to envisage in the absence of a strong risk-pooling function. While risk pooling 
is not a sufficient condition, it is nevertheless a necessary one for a wider range of health service 
functions that we associate with developed health systems such as health technology assessment, 
population needs assessment, priority setting, collective purchasing, and resource allocation 
based on need—in short, with a well-developed purchasing function.  
 
Beyond the technical considerations outlined above, there is also the important question of 
“social capital”: the degree to which a community shares values and is prepared to support 
communal structures and pool resources. For all the rhetoric of the Alma Ata Declaration, and 
the emphasis on the virtues of “community participation,” trust and social solidarity have been 
severely eroded in many areas. In former communist countries, for example, people may have a 
widespread suspicion of collectivity and officialdom. In such an environment, the establishment 
of voluntary risk-pooling will be particularly challenging. Though hard to measure, “social 
capital” theories do point to an important intangible benefit that underlies a strong risk-pooling 
function [52]. 
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We hope that we have demonstrated that in principle the desirability of strengthening risk-pool 
integration should be uncontested for most health care systems. Rather, the debate surrounds 
how it can be practically implemented in low- and middle-income countries, particularly when 
increased devolution and a reliance on community financing and user charges leads to 
fragmented risk pools. Our discussion has sought to highlight the many considerations that apply 
to any choice, and we have emphasized that system design will be contingent on local 
circumstances. We nevertheless believe that there will be few circumstances in which some form 
of risk pool integration cannot be successfully introduced and strengthened. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
This appendix presents some rudimentary mathematics of risk pooling. The main source is the 
material presented by Daykin, Pentikäinen, and Pesonen (1994). For most purposes it assumes 
random, independent arrival of claims arising from a homogeneous population of insured risks. 
These assumptions might be seriously overrestrictive in health care. Claims may not be 
independent (sometimes arising, for example, from an epidemic). And the insured risks are most 
certainly not homogeneous. With suitable amendments these complications can be 
accommodated within the mathematical model presented here. However, they render the models 
less transparent, and so for the most part the treatment will be confined to the simplest situation. 
MODELING THE NUMBER OF CLAIMS 
First consider the number of claims against the risk pool. Assuming first that the expected 
number of claims in a period is n, and that they are randomly and independently distributed, they 
can be modeled as a Poisson process: 
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where pk is the probability of observing k claims in the given period. 
 
Note that the mean and variance of the Poisson distribution are :n = n and Φn2 = n, and that the 
probabilities are readily calculated using the recursive equations: 
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As k and n get large, the central limit theorem implies that the cumulative Poisson distribution 
F(k)—the probability that k or fewer claims are received—approximates the normal distribution 
N(.), such that  
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Where this is not sufficiently accurate, a convenient approximation to the Poisson distribution is 
given by: 



 +−

 +≈ −
n
nnkNkF
24
1
2
3
8
5
2
3)( 6/1
3/2
. 
 
The assumption of a pure Poisson process may be inappropriate—the parameter n may vary 
through time because of (a) long term trends (b) cyclical or seasonal variations. This is handled 
by adopting a mixed Poisson process, in which the parameter n is multiplied by a mixing 
variable q, with a pdf h(q), such that E(q)=1. The parameter q can be thought of as changing risk 
propensity, and effectively models the uncertainty in the parameter n. At any time when the 
mixing variable takes the value q, claims are distributed according to a Poisson process with 
mean nq, and the mixed Poisson probability pk is now given by: 
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The key function of the mixing variable is to increase the variance to Φn2 = n + n2Φq2 where Φq2 
is variance of the mixing variable q. The mean number of claims remains :n = n. 
MODELING THE SIZE OF CLAIMS  
Suppose that the size of claims is independent of the number of claims, and are independently 
and identically distributed as a random variable Z. First define the probability that—given there 
are k claims in the chosen time period—the total claims against the risk pool are less than X: 
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Then the total claim X will be distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F(.), 
where 
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F(X) is the probability that the claims will not exceed a value of X in total in the chosen time 
period. Note that for k>0, Sk*(.) satisfies the recursive equation: 
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The total claim distribution X is a compound distribution, referred to as a compound Poisson 
distribution when the claim numbers are Poisson distributed. Under the assumptions of 
independence noted above, the expected claim X is merely the product of the expected number of 
claims n and the expected size of each claim m: 
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Further, in this Poisson case, the variance and skewness of X are given by: 
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where aj is the jth moment of the distribution of Z about zero. 
 
It is sometimes convenient to partition the variance as: 
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The first term on the right hand side is the variance associated with the Poisson process (that is 
to variations in the number of claims), and the second term on the right hand side is the variance 
associated with the size of individual claims. 
32 
 
 
 
The total claim distribution X is referred to as a compound mixed Poisson distribution when the 
claim numbers are distributed as a mixed Poisson process. In the compound mixed Poisson case 
the variance and skewness are as follows: 
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where  is the variance in the compound Poisson case. Note that an additional term 
determined by the variance of the mixing variable is added to the expression for the variance. An 
alternative way of decomposing the variance of X is to write it as: 
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The three components are: 
the variance associated with the Poisson process (claim numbers only, with no claim size 
variation or mixing); 
the variance associated with the individual claim sizes; 
the variance associated with mixing. 
 
The standard deviation of X is sometimes written: 
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Note that r2 is merely the square of the conventional coefficient of variation of Z, and can be 
thought of as an indication of the riskiness of the claim size distribution. 
 
 Then the coefficient of variation of the total claim size is given by: 
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Thus for small n the randomness associated with individual claims predominates, while as n 
increases the variation associated with the mixing element becomes more important. 
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SOME ELABORATIONS 
We have so far considered “pure” insurance, in the sense that all claims of whatever size must be 
met by the risk pool. There are of course many arrangements such as reinsurance and 
copayments which might moderate this extreme case. These might include: 
 
Excluding large claims: this entails modeling the distribution of S as a censored distribution Sc(.) 
Which takes the form  for Z<C, the chosen cut-off. )(/)()( CSZSZSc =
Limiting the size of all claims: this entails modeling the distribution of S as a truncated 
distribution St(.) Which takes the form )()( ZSZSt =  for Z<T, the chosen cut-off, and 1)( =ZtS  
for Z≥T. If effected through a reinsurance contract, this arrangement is known as an excess of 
loss treaty. 
Cost sharing all claims: this entails modeling the distribution of S as a distribution Sr(.) Which 
takes the form  for all Z, where r is the proportion of the claims met by the risk 
pool. 
)/()( rZSZSr =
Limiting the aggregate of claims: this is effectively a “stop-loss” reinsurance arrangement under 
which the distribution function F(X) for the total claim X is truncated at some limit M. 
 
Each of these arrangements serves to reduce the risk exposure of the risk pool, and the analytic 
properties have been thoroughly explored in the insurance literature. 
 
Sources 
 
Daykin, C., T. Pentikäinen and M. Pesonen (1994), Practical risk theory for actuaries, London: 
Chapman and Hall. 
 
Kendall, M. and A. Stuart (1977), The advanced theory of statistics: Volume 1, distribution 
theory, London: Charles Griffin & Company. 
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